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aims to show the limit and relativity, or to expose the amusing false certainty, of one’s 
own consciousness, regardless of which side may be adjudicated right or wrong, 
superior or inferior, as a result of such comparisons.
In other words, comparative philosophy, as philosophy, is perhaps best con-
ducted by a specialist of a foreign culture who not infrequently casts a backward 
glance at one’s own culture, as opposed to by a specialist of one’s own culture look-
ing out into an exotic foreign culture for similarities and differences that may be used 
to confirm some preferred transcultural wisdoms or character types. In brief, what 
comparative philosophy ought to do to philosophy may resemble something like 
what Michael Taussig’s symbolic anthropology has done to anthropology — it teases 
and criticizes one’s own culture, aiming to unself one’s own deep-entrenched illu-
sions, to expose the limit of one’s consciousness, as opposed to strengthening and 
expanding it at the expense of the rivals’.
Notes
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The brief response by Rui Zhu provides an interesting take on the (by now) peren-
nial problem of what comparative philosophy is or should be. While Zhu makes 
some interesting observations about and suggestions for comparative philosophy, he 
chooses contributions to the thinking about the possibilities and methodologies of 
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comparative philosophy that are rather old, though, and my first wonder is: why 
these two papers, and not more recent contributions to the development of the meth-
odology of comparative philosophy, as can be found in numerous recently published 
work? Such more recent publications tend to take a more nuanced approach to the 
idea of (in-)commensurability than the two essays from 1991, given the develop-
ments in comparative philosophy in the last twenty-five years.
Zhu first discusses Rorty, and claims that Rorty’s ideas amount to “a dismissal of 
comparative philosophy.” This is where my first disagreement arises. The fact that 
Rorty challenges the dominant style of doing philosophy in the West seems not so 
much to suggest that he wants to rid us of philosophy, but to me at least can be 
 understood as a positive development for comparative philosophy. The term ‘philos-
ophy’ has been, especially in the last twenty-five years, a hot topic for thinkers who 
see themselves as comparative, for multiple reasons. First of all, if one defines philos-
ophers as Rorty does, then it is indeed clear that certain thinkers from non-Western 
traditions would not fit that bill. This is the reason why many thinkers have a problem 
with the term, as it is reflective and representative of a tradition of thinking that is 
indeed essentialist and dualist. Thinkers from other traditions may have put less em-
phasis on essentialism and dualism, and for some this is a reason to exclude those 
thinkers from the discourse of philosophy. So I think that Rorty does not want “com-
parison sans philosophy,” as Zhu suggests; rather he wants comparative philosophy 
to not be dominated by the specifically Western understanding of the term, which 
is a very strict and narrow understanding, and by extension Rorty thinks the specifi-
cally Western problems and terminology that have been the concern of Western 
philosophers throughout the history of Western philosophy, examples being ‘truth’ 
and ‘rationality’, may not be the best candidates when attempting to do comparative 
philosophy. Many comparative thinkers have argued in the last twenty-five years that 
such concepts or notions may be absent from other cultures, or may not have had any 
prominence in the thought of those cultures as they did in Western philosophy.
In my view, it is a definite advancement that recent comparative philosophy is 
trying to step away from essentialism, the concept of ‘essence’ not even being prom-
inent in other traditions such as the Chinese in the first place. This means that post-
modern thinkers who have actively challenged the dominant Western tradition 
provide a more fruitful platform for comparison, since they display the kind of open-
ness often lacking in the ‘stricter’ philosophers.
Second and following up on this, using the term ‘philosophy’ is problematic for 
comparative philosophers since by the very nature of our profession we would then 
have to widen the scope of philosophy, which would inevitably result in disagree-
ments about the limits and boundaries of what philosophy is in general. Yet this does 
not necessarily mean we need to let go of the term. There is a different understanding 
of ‘philosopher’ that may be a bit more humble than Rorty’s “ascetic priest.” Culture 
and philosophy will never be considered the same, so we should not argue that any 
serious contributor to a culture would automatically count as a philosopher. But in-
stead we could easily argue for some minimum criteria that an author or thinker 
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would need to display to count as a philosopher. One such criterion would be that 
the thinkers are able at least to distance themselves from their own culture. They are 
not purely cultural products or participants or even producers of culture, but analyze 
and criticize aspects of life that others take for granted. Such distancing need not be 
done as an “ascetic priest,” but can be realized in many other ways. In my view it 
would be useful to keep such criteria to the minimum so as to promote inclusion of 
those thinkers who do not fit the strict criteria of ‘Western’ philosophy.
My second criticism of Zhu’s response lies in the fact that Zhu seems to suggest 
that we need such a “‘priestly’ consciousness” or else there would just be cultural 
clashes. I think Rorty would reply to this that it may be exactly the “priestly con-
sciousness” with its accompanying presumption of single standards, correct ways 
of thinking, and ‘universal’ tendencies that provides a fertile field for clashes. It is 
patently untrue that there are no genuine agreements among different people except 
Zhu’s suggested “agreement of the weak to be enslaved by the strong.” Although such 
genuine agreements tend not to make headlines, though, surely any (comparative) 
philosopher who has spent any extended period of time out of their own culture 
would see this borne out continuously.
This brings both Zhu and myself to MacIntyre. Zhu argues that MacIntyre’s stance 
of the rivalry of incommensurable positions itself does not suit the “true nature of 
philosophical thinking.” I agree with Zhu that nothing in the idea of incommen-
surability itself seems to suggest winners or losers, and, if anything, such a way of 
thinking is really not what any comparative philosopher seems to be interested in. 
Yet the fact that we may not be able to show who is superior according to a set of 
neutral criteria, having questioned the appropriateness of any such set, surely does 
not mean that we cannot point out any inconsistencies according to the logic of 
a certain tradition itself. This is what MacIntyre really seems to be after, and then 
surely thinking through what such inconsistencies can teach us might lead us, as it 
did Zhuangzi, for example, to point out similar (or other) inconsistencies in our own 
thinking.
This brings me to the final paragraph of Zhu’s discussion, where he indeed sug-
gests that this is exactly what comparative philosophy should be: an “object-centered 
self-reflection” that ironically through the study of other cultures points to us our own 
shortcomings. While this may indeed be one of the more amusing facets of doing 
comparative philosophy, and surely a very important feature of comparative thought,1 
whether the true nature of comparative philosophy can be exhausted by seeing it as 
cultivating irony through an object-centered self-reflection remains doubtful. First of 
all because we may well begin to wonder at this point if there is such a thing as the 
“true nature” of (comparative) philosophy, having questioned what philosophy is or 
should be, and as comparative thinkers constantly arguing for at least a certain ex-
pansion of the thinking practices that should count as philosophy.
Second, because one of the dangers that more recent comparative philosophy is 
always warning us about seems to be exactly such a one-sided view of comparative 
philosophy. Heidegger, for example, whose work is often used in comparative philos-
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ophy, was himself (at least initially) really only interested in non-Western thought to 
further his own ideas. Now Heidegger was by no means a specialist in classical Chi-
nese culture or thought, but he did use his knowledge of the Laozi and Zhuangzi 
for some self-reflection. But such self-reflection does not really do justice to the 
 other culture as other, as both critics and proponents of Heidegger’s place in com-
parative philosophy have pointed out. And if the object of the encounter is indeed a 
form of self-reflection, then we may question whether being a specialist of a foreign 
culture will help us more in such self-reflection than being a specialist of one’s own 
culture.
But we may first wonder if this is really what Zhu means by “object-centered.” Is 
what is central the object of comparison, that is, the other culture and its ways of 
thought, or is it really about what that other culture can teach our own, in which case 
the center is the self-reflection? To put this in the context of Zhu’s response, I do not 
think that being a “specialist of a foreign culture” (italics in original) is inherently an 
advantage over being a specialist of one’s own culture. In fact I would argue that in 
comparative philosophy both these qualities are needed equally, and even further 
that one really cannot even be one of these without also being the other. In fact even 
MacIntyre suggests so much in the volume under discussion, where he says (with 
regard to translation): “Inhabiting both standpoints [those of one’s own and of the 
foreign language], only such persons will be able to recognize what is translatable 
and what is untranslatable in the transition from one such language to the other” 
(Deutsch 1991, p. 111). I am quite confident that Zhu will agree with me that the last 
thing we want in comparative philosophy is the idea of a foreign specialist of your 
culture telling you that she knows better what you are thinking than you yourself do. 
But maybe the “object-centered” part of Zhu’s position of an “object-centered self- 
reflection” may function to diminish this criticism, if Zhu means that the object that 
is used to make us “self-reflect” is really the center of the whole process. But this 
seems unclear in both the response and in how one could possibly have the other 
culture as well as the self-reflection both being central, and I would welcome Zhu’s 
reflections on this.
I now come to my third and last question regarding Zhu’s idea of comparative 
philosophy as object-centered self-reflection: does not the very notion of a specialist 
of a foreign culture seem to imply that one can be or often is already a specialist of 
one’s own culture? It may be true that in a certain way being a specialist of one’s own 
culture is not conducive to a full understanding of another culture, but it may also be 
true that only specialists of one’s own culture can have a deep appreciation of an-
other culture, exactly because they understand the presuppositions and prejudices of 
their own culture. And it is not at all clear to me that being a specialist of a foreign 
culture gives you the right or acumen to provide judgments about the perceived prej-
udices of one’s own culture, and neither is it always the case that specialists of their 
own culture are always out to “confirm some preferred transcultural wisdoms or 
character types.” It thus seems to me that thinking in these terms of specialization 
may be confusing and misleading rather than helpful.
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Instead, I would venture an opposite (and maybe equally indefensible) position: 
are not all of us comparative philosophers rather outsiders when it comes to most 
of the cultures we are trying to compare? I personally try to compare Heidegger, 
Derrida, and classical Daoism, but am an insider of none of these “cultures.” Al-
though Heidegger and Derrida are obviously closer to home for me, I do not for one 
moment think that I can arrive at the same understanding of German or French cul-
ture that Heidegger and Derrida must have had, not least because I think that they 
had very specific views and ideas of what these cultures are or were. And as for the 
culture of the Chinese classics, as well as that of the ancient Greek classics, I would 
also consider all of us to be more outsiders than insiders to such cultures, assuming 
we can even consider these cultures as identifiable entities. A “specialist of one’s 
own culture,” just as much as a “specialist of a foreign culture,” sounds too essen-
tialist for my taste. It seems to suggest that there are such things as “one’s own cul-
ture” and “a foreign culture” that are identifiable, learnable entities, and that one 
can consider oneself an insider or outsider of such identifiable entities. I would prefer 
to not work with such categories of insider and outsider, and would hope that com-
parative philosophy is exactly the discipline that challenges and questions such 
 dichotomies.
To wrap up, it seems to me that the view of comparative philosophy espoused 
here by Zhu is limited in its scope. It may be that Zhu is a believer of such limitation, 
and sincerely thinks that object-centered self-reflection is the only possibility given 
the incommensurability of different cultures. But then I would think that many more 
recent contributions to comparative philosophy have shown that MacIntyre’s strong 
incommensurability thesis is not really defensible. In fact, already in the same vol-
ume under discussion (Deutsch 1991), the chapter by Richard J. Bernstein seems to 
question such strong notions of incommensurability. And in the twenty-five years that 
have passed there have been numerous attempts at defining the goals and methodol-
ogy of comparative philosophy (not surprisingly in different ways!). One example of 
this is the idea that comparative philosophy should really be “fusion” philosophy. I 
wonder if Zhu’s suggestions would be able to account for or incorporate these recent 
diverse views of what comparative philosophy is or should be.
Note
1   –   In fact this specific aspect of comparative philosophy was already pointed out in 
the same volume (Deutsch 1991) that Zhu discusses, by Richard J. Bernstein, 
who suggests that it is “in our genuine encounters with what is other and alien 
that we can further our own self-understanding” (p. 93).
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